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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HARRIS BETHERS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS~

Case No.

9062
LALIF \VOOD~ d/b/a INDUSTRIAL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

AND RESPONDENT

ST. ~
. TEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Harris Bethers_. commenced this suit
in the District Court to- recover the agreed price of gravel
furnished pursuant to a \vritten contr-aet. The defendant
counterclaimed seeking alleged damages for a purported
delay in the furnishing of the gravel. There is no dispute
a..s to the amount of gravel furnished by the plaintiff4 For
practical purposes the merit of the counterclaim is the only
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genuine issue in the la.,vs uitr The trial court sitting with(}Ut
a jury took evidence on the complaint and counterclaim.
On plaintiff's motion, judgment was entered on the complaint for the gravel furnished by plaintiff, and the counterclaim ¥~Tas dismissed.. This appeal followed. The parties
will be referred to as they were in the Court below. .CiR''
indicates page numbers of the record on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 16;1 1957~ the defendant, as prime contractor, entered into a contract with the State of Utah for the
construction of approximately twelve miles of State road
in Kane County.. Defendant then entered into a subcontract
\vith the plaintiff ~~~hereby the defendant agreed to pay
specified prices per ton for three types of gravel to he
furnished by the plaintiff. The defendant entered upon
pe-rfonnance of the contrat.-t during the early part of February and thereafter completed the job to the satisfaction
of and \vi thin the time allowed by the State of Utab under
the prime contract.. By August 10, 1957 ~ the plaintiff had
furnished a.Il of the gravel which he had agreed to furnish
under the terms of the subcontract w:ith the exception of
certain gravel in stockpile.
The prime contract was completed December llJ: 1957~
with the reservati on that a certain quantity of gr.a vel would
later be stockpiled ( R. 113) . 0 n December 4, 1957, plaintiff a.nd defendant modified the subcontract to provide terms
for the furnishing by the defendant of certain gravel iri
stock pile (Exhibit 7) ~ Except as amended, the original
subcontract renJained in full force and effect. There was
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nothing in the amendment of December 4 to indicate that
defendant \vas then claiming damages against plaintiff.
There was a delay in the completion of the stockpiling under
the amended subcontract and on December 21 (Exhibit 8)

defendant terminated the subcontract and took over under
Section 3 thereof which provided that ''should contractor
have to assume charge on account of delay by ~ubcontractor~
the expense accrued therein ,~,:rill be deducted from the
contract price'' (Exhibit 1). The "expense accrued" (being
the additional cost of obtaining gravel for. stockpiling from
other sources) was charged against the contract price.. 'fhe
trial court took this into account in determining the amount
due for gravel furnished by the plaintiff (See Exhibit 3).
Defendant's counterclaim is predicated upon a theory
that he is entitled to damages for delay incurred prior to
the amendme11t of the: contract. The plaintiff denies that
there wa.s any delay chargea-ble to him and alleges that the
purported counterclaim is b a.rred by the provisions. of the
subcontract and by defendant's failure to con1ply with it.
The defendant commenced the first \Vork on the job
during the early part of Jl,ebruary, 1957r Certain grading
was required before gravel could be used. Gravel crushing
operations commenced 1\1arch 4. The defendant \Vas to
pick up the gravel at the site of the crushing plant (Exhibit
1). Although there \Vas no provision in the contract as to
\Vhen plaintiff's operation \\'"a.5 to begin~ defendant suggests
that plaintiff should ·have been on the job sooner. Under
the provisions of the prime contract, all gravel had to be
weighed before it was placed in the road (Exhibit 10, Sheet
5), and the subcontract required the defendant to furnish
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scales for weighing same. The defendant did not furnish
the scales until sometime between February 25 and March
4 and thus if there V\;ras a delay it could not have been materiaL There was no obligation on the part of plaintiff to
stockpile the gravel, and until the scales arrived, the operation intended by the parties could not be carried out. Gravel
crushing operations began about the time the defendant
furnished the scales to 'veigh the graveL

In an attempt to prove delayt the defendant introduced
a bar graph showing the timetable of operations on the job
(Exhibit 11) . It was contended by defendant that plaintiff had failed to comply with the time schedule set forth
on the bat' graph (R. 22).. This time schedule was prepared
by the defendant . Although it is not adnritted tha.t the time
schedule set forth in the bar graph was in any way binding
on the plaintiff t it is significant to note that the furnishing
of gravel was actually ahead of the defendantts estimate
as to the length of tim-e it would take to produce the same.
The bar gt~aph indicated 140 working days to furnish the
coarse gravel and said gravel was furnished in considerably less time (R . 102). The graph indicated 130 days to
furnish the type ~'B' ~ gravel and 99% was furnished vrithin
said time (R. 103). The other 1% was represented by

stockpile at a site known as the Blue Pool Bridge. The ne.
cember 4 amendment to the eontract cGvered an uncompleted portion of gravel to. be stockpiled under the subcontr~t and

gravel for stockpiling in addition to that specified
in the sub contract.

The su be on tract required plaintiff to furnish coarse
gravel at $. 38 per ton ; type ~ ~B t,. gravel at $.38 per tont and
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gravel at $1.75 per ton (Exhibit 1). Defendant was
paid by the State of Utah for the same materials at the
rate of $.72 per ton for the coarse; $.75 per ton for the
type ~~B~'~ and $2.00 per ton for the type '~A'' (Exhibit 10)
Although defendant was paid by the State for all of the
gravel furnished by plaintiff~ he refused to pay plaintiff
for gravel furnished after June, 19 57.. The con tract provided that progress payments "~ould be made upon the basis
of the engineers~ reports (Exhibit P-1) . Plaintiff produced
gravel during a11 of the summer months with no payment
'vhatever for the materials fu rni shed4 In this regard the
trial court found:

type

1

'A~,

4

defendant paid a part of the agreed purchase price of said gravel but failed and refused to
pay the plaintiff for the gravel furnished for the
months of July~ August 1 September and October
and for part of the gravel furnished during the
month of December, aU in the year 1957. The subcontract required the defendant to make progress
payments to the plaintiff for gravel furnished during each of said months and the defendant failed
and refused to do son (R . 162, 163).
~~The

Defendant claims that he had ~en and equipment on
stand-by during the rn onths of July to October ( R. 12-15)
and that plaintiff should be charged 'vith the wages of defendanes employees and the rental value of his equipment
because of an alleged delay on the part of plaintiff in furnishing the gravel. It is admitted that no notice of such
c) aim was given to the plaintiff until long after it is claimed
to have accrued.. The Dece1nber amendment to the subcontract was after virtual completion of the road and provided
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additional ;,v ork for the plaintiff in stockpiling~ There
no recital in the amendment of any alleged claim.

'tV as

f"rhe defendant's counterclaim "\iYTas disclosed for the

first time \Vhcn this suit \Vas brought . The trial court held
that the measure of damages and rem-edy for delay specified in the subcontract \Vas conclusive on the defendant.
S i nee defendant had already been credited \Vith the measure
of damages specified therein, there ~ras no further issue
on the ccunterclaiTn. The trial court furt-her held that defcndant~s failure to give notice of his alleged claim pursuant
to the provisions of the s ubcon tr&t barr-ed the claim and
that the defendant ~ra s not entitled to prosecute the same.

STATE):lE)JT OF POINTS RET . IED ON
POINT I.
~THE COl.~RT

DID NOT ERR IN DIST\fiSSING

'l'HE COUNTERCLATIVL

A.

Sections 3 and 5 (k) of the subcontract bar
the defendant~s claim for damages.

B.

The defendant's counterclaim is barred by
reason of his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5 (1) of the subcon-

tract4
C.

Defendant s failure to make progress payInents excused any delay in performance o£
the subcontract.

D.

'rhe defendant has. waived any right he might
have had to recover damages for delay4

1
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POIKT II.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING
Jl!DGMENT ON THE CO~iPLAINT.
1\RGUIVIENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR II\' DISIVIISSING
THE COUNTERCLAIM.

A.

Sections 3 and 5 (k} of the subcontract bar
the defendant's claim for damages.

Sections 3 and 5 of the subcontract so far as material
here provide as follo\vs:
~"'Section

3 ~ The Subcontractor agTee.s to complete the several portions and the whole of the \Vork
herein s ublct by the time or times f ollo\ving ~ (II ere
insert the date or dates and if there be liquid-ated
damages state them.)
HD-clivery of materials to keep up as directed, behind grading equipment at all times~
Should Contracto't ha.ve to a.ssume chwrge on
account of dela-y by Sub con tra~tor ~ the expense
acerucd therein 'will be deducted /1-o1n the co-ntTatt price. Contractor to receive gravel at site
of crushing plant in the bin.
~~section

5. The Contractor and Subcontractor
agree to be bound * * * by the folio\i\ring provisions: * * * The Contractor agrees- * * *
(k) To make no demand for liquidated damages or
penalty for delay in any sum in excess of such
amount as may be specifically named in the Subcontract. ')
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It is important to note that Section 3 of the subcontract is
a specific section dealing "dth the time for performance
and prescribing a remedy and measure of damages for
delay. The legal effect of this provision is to make any
delay on the part of the subcontractor a material breaeh
of thee contract which gives the contractor the remedy of
terminating the contr~lct and charging the entire cost of
completion against the contract price. This is a reasonable
and effective remedy. The issue before the District Co-urt
and before this Court on appeal is not what the measure of
damages for delay would be in the absence of this provision.
The question here is whether or not the remedy or measure
of damages prescribed by this section of the contract is
exclusive. We submit that the trial court did not err in
determining that it is.
It appears to be a majority rule of law that where the
parties to a contract pres~ribe a remedy for breach the
remedy so prescribed is exclusive. The general rule is stated
in 12 Am. Jur. 1042 as follows:
~,:*
* * I_W]hen parties stipulate in a con..
tract "\Vhat the co nseq uen ces of a breach of the agreemen t shall be~ such stipulation if reas.ona b1e is control1ing and excludes other consequences~ Where a
contract prescribes a remedy for a breach~ that
remedy is generaHy exclusive/'
This is a1so true where a rule or measure of damages is
referred to in the contract. The rule is expressed thus in
15 Am. Jur~ 448.
{~§49. Agreements as to d.amages.~Where par-ties agree upon a ru1e of damages t() be followed in
ease of a breach, no other or different rule wi1l be
enforce<t ~'
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There is no ru1e of law which prevents parties to a
contract from stipulating £or a particular remedy or measure of damages to apply on default and where there is such
a stipulationJ: it has been interpreted by the co-urts to be
exclusive~ A case applying this principle of law is Rubin
Vr Crow'-ey~ Milner & Compa.nyt 214 Mich. 365~ 183 N. W .
51. In the Rubin case plaintiff brought suit for the purchase
price of 18 coats sold to the defendant. The defendant
sought to offset the amount of its damages caused by an
aUeged nonconformity of the coats with samples submitted
before the Hale.....:\.mong the provisions of the contract vtras
the follo,ving:
goods in excess of purchase or different
from samples or spe-cifications~ returnable at shipper"H expense.''
"~All

The de-fendant contended that the language of the contract
simply gave him the right to return the goods but did not
provide an exclusive remedy for breach of contract, and
that it could elect to retain the coats and sue for its dam ..
ages. The court held that the remedy provided by the contract \vas exclusive. In construing the agreement,. the court
said~

instant case is one where an express
contract exists, where the parties have by express
agreement prQvided for the contingency \\,..hich arose
and agreed upon the measure of their liability~ Under
such circumstances \Ve do not feel called upon to
determine what the rights of the parties would be
in case there was no contract, * * * ~jl
~ ~ [T] he

In Edwards v. Perdue, 177 Ark. 241 . 6 S. \~l. 2d 20~ the
plaintiff sold a lease to the defendant under a contract pro-
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viding for the payment of the purchase priee in installments.
The Iease \\T as put in escrow 'vi th instructions to the escrow
agent that in the default of the payment of the purchase
price the lease ~;ras to be returned lo the seller after \Vhich
no obligation should remain. Plaintiff brought suit for
recovery of the balance of the purchase price and the defendant eontend ed by Vt-~ay of defense that the return of
the lease \va~ the sole remedy. The trial court allowed recovery of the balance of the purchase price and the Supreme
Court reversed. The rationale of the court is expressed iu
the foil u\vi ng l a.ngua.gu :
'~It

is a settled princip1 e of law that~ when the
parties themgelves in a. contract provide the remedy
h1 case of default by either party, the remedy- so
provided h~ conclusive.."
Similarly, in B ottemiller v Ball~ 13 0 Ore~ 255, 279 Pac. 542~
the buyer under a \Vl'itten land purchase contract agreed
that the sel1 er should be entitled to a surren dcr of the land
upon default in the performance o:f the con tract by the
buyer. The court "\Vas called upon to determine whether or
not upon the buyer's default the seller had any remedy other
than to recover the property. The court said ~
r

~",Vhen

the parties prepared their contract they
evidently anticipated such a situation as now con..
fronts them and made provision as to ho"\v the controversy shou1d be disposed of; that is, the defendant should 'H-urtender and deliver up the said property and premises to the· seller~~ They arc agreed
that this court has hold that 'vhen a contract pr&
scribes a ren1edy for a. breach, that remedy is generally exclusive and will be enforced. The following
adj u die. a tions justify their conclusions. ( Citing
Cases.)
1

'
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S~

In Buffalo Pitts Company v4 Alderdice, (Texas), 177
\\:' ~ 1044, the rule was expressed as follo1vs:

'' *

* * It has uniformly been ruled

that~

\Vhen the parties to a contract agree upon the reme-

dies that shall accrue in case of breach thereof, such
agreed re·med i es are ex:cl usi ve of all others.''
In McCready v. LindenbCYrn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E.
the Supreme Court of }~ e~~ York said:
~t

208~

* * * \Vhen the parties

by their contract
provide for the consequences of a breach~ lay do\Vll
a rule to admeasu1~e the damages~ and agree when
they are to be paid 7 the remedy thus provided must

be exclusively followed.'

1

In Ancrum v. Camden H>"ater, Li_qht & Ice Company, 82 S4
C~ 284J 64 S. E. 151, the rule was stated thus;
~'v"\1len

parties themselves stipulate in the contraL1 ~·hat shal1 be the cons-equences of a breach of
the agreement, Huch stipulation if reaHonable, is contro llingt and excludes other consequences. (Citing
Cases.)"
We submit that even disregarding Section 5 (k) of the
contract the legal e.f feet of prescribing a remedy for delay
in Section 3 wa.s to render Haid remedy exclusive. Regardless of the .above rule of law, however, it is clear ffom a
reading of the .subcontract that it was the intent uf the
parties that the remedy and measure provided be exclusive.
Assrnne the rule to be that the court must construe the
entire contract to determine whether or not the remedy
prescribed for de1ay \Vas intended by the parties to be exelusive. The same result must :follo,v. Section 3 was clearly
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intended by the parties to prescribe the time for performance and the penalty or remedy fGr delay. The parties c0:n...
templated that the contractor (defendant) would ''assume
charge" in the event of delay ·and deduct ~~he expense ac..
crued therein'' from the contract price. By paragraph 5 (k)
the contractor agrees '"'to make no demand for penalty for
delay in any sum in excess of such amount as may be specifically named in the subcontract.'" The ~~penalty for dela.y''
prescribed by Section 3 is the sum expended by the contrcw.
tor in completing the job afte1.. he has assum..ed charge on
account of delay. (In some cases this could equal or exceed
the contract price.) Thus, the very language of the contract
itself makes the penalty or remedy for delay prescribed in
Section 3 exclusive. A different construction would certainly
defeat the obvious intent of the parties. The parties did
not intend another or different remedy or measure of damages~

The most c-o ncl us i ve a.n.swer in thls. caset however, is
the fact that the contractor did "assume charge on account
of delay'' and the expense accrued therein \Vas charged
against the contract price. He did avail himself of the prescribed remedy. The evidence is clear as stated by appellant
in his brief that the defendant did take over performance
of the con tract as. modified· and it is. agreed that the entire
expense accrued therein was charged against the contra.ct
price. When defendant took over after te-nninating on
December 21~ he indicated in his letter of termination that
the measure of damages would be to \Vithhold the cost of
completion from amounts due plaintiff (Exhibit 8). This
should be the end of the c.ounterclaim4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

The defendant, having availed hlmse1f of the remedy
prescribed in the contract,. now seeks to recover under an
entirely separate remedy and measure of damages. Defendant says that he had men and equipment on stand-by dur·
ing the months of July through August; that the wages
and rental value thereof (amounting to a figure of approximately $53~000) is chargeable to the plaintiff; that he could
continue to incur a ~ounterclaim against defendant on the
theory of delay~ and that 'vhen this imaginative amount
had been incuned, he could then step in, complete· the contract, charge the entire cost of completion to the plaintiff*
and then recover the full amount of all of his claimed damages for the period he had not pursued the remedy prescribed in the contract. \Ve submit that the court properly
interpreted Sections 3 and 5 to limit the defend ant's recovery to the amount expend-ed in completing the contract
and to preclude the fantastic counterclaim.
The cases cited in defendant's brief in support of the
argument that the prescribed remedy is not exclusive do
not involve contracts prescribing a remedy for a specific
breach nor a provision (such as Section 5 (k)) expressly
limiting the contractor's remedy to that prescribed by the
pa.rties4 The general prin cip1 es of Iav...- urged by defendant
have no applicatio-n whatever to the facts of thls case where
the court must construe the con tract of the parties.
B..

The defendant's counterclaim is barred by
rea.son of his failure to comply \vith the requirements of Section 5 (1) of the subron..

tract .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
Section 5 (1) of the subcontr.act reads as follows:
~~The

Contractor agrees--(1) That no· claim for
services rendered Dr materials furnished by the Contractor to the subcontractor shall be valid unl-ess
\Vritten notice thereof is given by the Contractor
to the Subcontractor during the first ten days of the
cal e:n dar month :foil owing that in which the- claim
originated~ n

Defendant's counterclaim is composed of employee~s wages
and the alleged rental value of equipment (See Rr 22) . (De~
fendant \Vas allovved the item for gravel procured from
other sources.) )Io notice of claim covering these charges
was given to the subcontractor (See Supp1emental Record)~
This is not a case involving claims for delay consisting of
penalties imposed upon the contractor by the owner or
general al1egations of loss of pfofitsr The contractor seeks
here to charge men and equipment to the subcontraetor.
The question is 'vhether o-r not the contractor under the
provisions of his .contract may allow such expense to accrue
v?i thout notice to the subcontractor and still have a right
to recover the alleged items of expense. \Ve think that
Section ,-; ( 1) \Vas. drafted to avoid this very res uIt.

The obvious purport of Section 5 (I) was to pr{)vide
the subcontractor '\oVith notice of his standing with, and
obligation to the contractor. If the contractor was to charge
the subc~ntractor 'With the \Vages of employees or rental
value of equipment, the subcontractor was entitled to notice
as prescribed by the contract and in the absence thereof
no such claim is HvaUd. ~J
In urging that the trial court erred in interpreting
Section 5 (l), the defendant cites a single case which con-
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strues the \vords ustockyard services'' as used in a statute.
Obviously, the judicial interpretation of the words ~~stock
yard servicesn could have no application to the facts of this
case. Contrary to the defendant~s tortuous construction to
require something Hu sefuPt ( ~"hatev er that means) ~ the
purpose of the provision in which this word '~services~' is

used is to give notice of the charge to the subcontractor. It
gives hi:tn a right to know of these charges as they accrue
so that he may knoy~r of his standing "\vith the contractor
and do \~.rhat is necessary to avoid such future charges. If
he is to be charged, it is of no concern to him whether the
service is chat~ acterized: as useful or n ot4 I-I is in tcrest is in
the purported charge- and an itemization thereof and not
an analysis of the eharaeter of it. It makes no difference
\vhether the m€n and equipment \vere actually 'vorking in
what. the: con tractor characterizes a ~~use-ful endeavor~' so
long aB the charge \\'"as tn be made to the plaintiff. Section
5 ( l) gave him a right to knu\v of the claimr If the charges
for alleged rental value and Vitage expense are for Hservices''
within the meaning of Section 5 (1) as eon.st·ru,ed 'ht light of
the purpose of the pro ·vision in tv hick they are f ottnd, the
defendanes failure to give notice bars his claim~ The issue
is just that simp1e.
The legal definitio-n commonly given for the ·wnrd. Hservices~J is expressed in 79 C. J4 S. 1143~ as follows:
HServices.. * * * In the- plural the term involves more than mere 1aborl' and signifies much
more than merely the act of performing labor and
may include as well expenditurest tnl:iterials and
things furnished .
Jf
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In the case of Levitt v. Fabe'f'", et al.~ 64 P . 2d 498,: the California court distinguished between the terms {~services't and
"~personal .services. l' In so doing,. the court said :
t

"· 'Services" and 'personal services are not definitely co-extensive. * * * 'Services' may be
rendered though the actual labor be performed by
one's emp~oyees and by mea.ns of his machinery or
other equipment, but "personal servicesl' are those
performed by the individual himself.'' (Emphasis
supplied.)
t

Thus services includes not only manpower but machinery
and equipment. See also People v. McCord~ 59 P ~ 2d 587t interpreting the language '~services or materials to include
a charge for transportati~n.
1

)

Considering the purpose o£ the text wher-e it is foundJ
the language '~claim fo.r services rendered"' includes the
wages of employees and the rental value of equipment which
the defendant seeks by his counterclaim to charge to the
plaintiff. The whole purpose of Section 5 (1) is to give
notice to the subcontractor of any such claim and an interpretation which 'vould allow the contractor to charge such
items to the subcontractor and recover the same without
notice frustrates the plain 1anguage and intent of the written instrument. The court did not err in holding that the
counterclaim 'vas barred for defendant~s failure to comply
¥lith Section 5 (1).

C.

Defendant~s

failure to make progress payments excused any delay in performance of
the subcontract

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
The plaintiff is suing for gravel furnished after June
30~

1957. Defendant claims that he had men and equipment on stand-by during that period. During the same period the defendant failed and refused to make progTess payments for the gravel furnished by the plaintiff. The failure
to make progress payment-S was a material breach of the
subcontract which would not only have j u~tified the plaintiff~s termination of the contract had he chosen to do so,
but under the eire umstance s constituted a 1egal excuse for
any delay.. In Guerini Stone Company V~ CarUn Co11Struction Company, 248 U~ S . 334, 345, the United States Supreme
Court said:
H* * $ In a building or construction contract like the one in question, calling for the performance o.f labor and furnishing of materials. * * *
a stipulation for payments on account to be made
from. time to time during the pro-gress of the vror k
must be deemed so material that a substantial failure wou1d justify the con tractor in declining to proceed.'"
The general rule of law to the· same effect is set forth in 17
C. J. S . 981. If such a failure on the part of the con~
tractor would excuse further performance on the part of
the subcontractor, certain1y it would excuse delay in performance.. The contractor should not be heard to complain
of delay at the same time he is withholding payments due
the subcontractor under the provisions of the contract. The
defendant is not entitled to insist upon a strict compliance
with the time provisions of the -contract when he himself
has failed to do his part on time or at all.. 'Ve submit that
the defend-ant's failure to comply in this respect is a bar
to his counterclaim.
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D..

The defendant ·has waived any right he might
have had to rec-over dam.a.ges for delay.

A party entitled to dan1ages may lose his right to recover the same by wai vcr ~ Sherer v. City of LagunGt BeafJhJ
(Cal.~ 1936), 57 P . 2d 157. In this case the defendant ciaims
to have built up a very substantial claim for damages by
reason of alleged breach of the subcontract. Not only did
th c defendant fall to notify the plain tiff of the accrual of
gaid clain1, but after all alleged items thereof had been incurred~ the subcontract "\vas amended and the subcontractor
was directed to go on \vith his work in furnishing gravel.
The defendant ""~as pro bah ly appreh en si ve that had he made
a proper (!la.im at that time for the fantastic amounts he
nov1 seeks to recover plaintiff "vould not have been ''illing
to suppleme-nt the subcontract and· to continue perform.ance
th er ~unde-r. \l..] hatever the exp1anationt the supplement contained no reference 0-r reservation of the defendant's purported claim. Eve-n ~rhen the defendant terminated the subcontract on D-ecember 21t 1 957, the only indication of any
claim for damages ~vas that defendant "vould 1vithhold the
expense of furnishing the unexecuted portions of the subcontract ("Exhibit 8). This 'vas done. Vle submit that in
allowing the defendant to- perform under the contract and
under the supplement thereto over a period of approximately
six n1onths \vithout notice of the purported claim ,vhich he
contends ,~~as accruing and in amending the contract and
terminating it 'vithout reference to the items set forth in
the counterclaim~ the defendant has effectively \V ai ved the
claim for damages and should not be allowed to assert the
same.
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POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING
JUDGMENT ON THE COMPLAINT.
Defendant contends that the plaintiff did not substantially perform the subcontract. ~fhe evidence conclusively
shows that he did. The subcontract and! the amendment
thereto called for plaintiff to furnish three different types
of gravel the aggregate quantity of which was 182~510 tons
(Exhibits P-1 and 4). The plaintiff actually furnished
187,919.85 tons (Exhibit P~2) ~ or approximately 5,.400 tons
in addition to the tonnage specified in the contract. It is
true that the job required gravel in excess of that specified
in the contract but the total of all gravel purchased by the
defendant from outside sources was only 4~287 tons (Exhibit 3). In accordance with the agreement o.f the parties,
the cost of this gravel was deducted from the contract price
due plaintiff. Under the con tract (Sections 2, 3 and 4)
plaintiff \Va.s entitled to the contract price less this deduction. The eventuality that defendant might take over and
expend monies in comp1eti on v..~ as specifically provided for
and it is clear that the contract was so dravm. as to allo'"'~
recovery for gravel furnished by the plaintiff regardless
of delay.
On the issue of delay the evidence compels a finding
that the plaintiff substantially performed under the time
requirements of the contract. As already pointed out, the
gravel for the road~bed w-as actually furnished in less time

than the defendant himself prescribed in the time schedule
(See page 4~ supra) . The defendant actually finished his
con tract with the State ahead of schedule..
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In a.ny event it could hardly be contended \Vith any
semblence of reason that the plaintiff is not entitled to be
compensated for the gravel furnished to the defendant
The defendant was compensated by the State for every ton
of gravel furnished by the- plaintiff~ Even ignoring the
contra-ct \vhich, in the event of delay, directs the payment
of the contract price less defendant~s cost of acquiring
other gravel, quantum meruit would bring more than the
contract price judging from the price whlch defendant paid
for the additional gravel (Exhibits 3 and 7) and the price
he obtained from the State ("Rxhibit P -1) . The value to
him of the gra.vel furnished by the p1aintiff far exceeded
the cost \Vhlch plaintiff wag allo,ved to recover. ~7e submit
that the judgment on the complaint should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
'Ve subrrrit that a reasonable and fair construction of
- the subcontract precludes the defendant from recovery of
the alleged items of damage specified in the counterclaim.
The defendant's own flagrant refusal to meet the time requirements regarding progress payments and to give notice
of the purported claim as it accrued is also a complete defens e to the counterclaim. The court did not err in alloiDng
the plaintiff the agreed cost of the gravel furnished less
the added cost to defendant of procuring additional gravel.

''r

e submit that the judgment of the tria 1 court should be
affirmed.
Respectful1y subnri ttedt
GRANT MACFARLA-NE,
GRANT MA·CFARLANEt JR.,

A tto1~1-eys for Pl.aintiff
and Respondent.
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